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A Multi-Criteria Ranking of Security Countermeasures ∗
Nicola Nostro	, Ilaria Matteucci\, Andrea Ceccarelli], Francesco Santini3, Felicita Di Giandomenico[,
Fabio Martinelli\, Andrea Bondavalli]





We propose a multi-criteria framework for ranking control-
ling strategies according to several weights, such as delay-
time, resource cost, and success-probability of attacks defined
via quantitative threat analysis. Therefore, by assigning a
different priority to weight-dimensions, we can rank con-
trollers in an adaptive way. We exemplify our approach on
the Customer Energy Management System (CEMS), that
acting as an interface among different systems, is exposed
to attacks. We consider both the Man in the Middle (MiM)
and the Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents an adaptive multi-criteria framework
for ranking controlling strategies to minimize the impact
of attacks, thus helping in defining controllers that favour
security, cost-effectiveness, or energy efficiency. We enhance
the results in [12] by introducing a multi-criteria analysis to
drive the countermeasures ranking.
The proposed framework consists of two main steps: i)
a security analysis, performed by ADversary VIew Security
Evaluation (ADVISE) formalism [8] in order to evaluate at-
tack points and paths with respect to several criteria and to
identify those that are feasible, and to rank attack weights,
from the perspective of an attacker; ii) an evaluation of dif-
ferent run-time execution traces, corresponding to several
countermeasures on the basis of the multi-criteria analysis
results. The classification is driven by the system’s require-
ments hierarchy and it is modelled by the order of the con-
sidered semiring [1]. We exemplify the proposed framework
on the Customer Energy Management System [7], a service
of the low voltage grid for an advanced energy management.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the
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multi-criteria framework for the ranking of countermeasures.
Section 3 recalls controllers and formally defines the multi-
criteria ranking. Section 4 exemplifies our approach on the
CEMS reference scenario. Section 5 discusses related work
and Sec. 6 draws conclusions and future work.
2. RANKING SECURITY STRATEGIES VIA
SECURITY ANALYSIS
System requirements are expressed in the form of a hi-
erarchy, with stringent requirements at top level, and less
stringent ones in lower positions. In our framework, the
ranking of controllers drives the selection of the best one
with respect to the current hierarchy of requirements. In
case of reorganization of the requirements hierarchy (e.g., in
multiple-phased systems, whose operational life spans mul-
tiple phases characterized by different functional and non-
functional requirements), a new ranking is easily provided
without performing the analysis of the whole system again.
The framework is composed by the following steps:
- the system specificationin terms of its functional and non-
functional requirements;
- once the system has been modelled, a security assessment
is performed, thus providing a series of possible attacks that
can be perpetrated on the system. The analysis considers
several criteria and provides an estimation of each attack
according to all criteria under investigation. Since the def-
inition of the profile of an attacker is at the basis of the
risk&threat evaluation processes [11], we defined two attack-
ers’ profiles: hacker and civil activist ;
- the exploitation of functional and non-functional system’s
requirements to classify countermeasures according to pos-
sible trade-off among different criteria. Given the variety of
potential attackers behaviour, we define several controllers
that follow the attacker’s behaviour step by step;
- the adaptive ranking of countermeasures driven by the re-
quirements’ hierarchy. Indeed, we use the information on
the attack, obtained through the security analysis, to clas-
sify and rank countermeasures also according to the system’s
requirements.
3. MULTI-CRITERIA CLASSIFICATION OF
QUANTITATIVE COUNTERMEASURES
We adopt semirings as the algebraic formalism to repre-
sent metrics used to rank the countermeasures.
Definition 3.1 (c-semiring [1]). A c-semiring is a
five-tuple K = 〈K,+,×,⊥,>〉 such that K is a set, >,⊥ ∈
K, and +,× : K ×K → K are binary operators making the
triples 〈K,+,⊥〉 and 〈K,×,>〉 commutative monoids (semi-
groups with identity), satisfying i) (distributivity) ∀a, b, c ∈
K.a × (b + c) = (a × b) + (a × c), ii) (annihilator) ∀a ∈
A.a×⊥ = ⊥, and iii) (top element) ∀a ∈ K.a+> = >.
The idempotency of + leads to the definition of a partial
ordering ≤K over the set K (K is a poset). Such complete
partial order is defined as a ≤K b if and only if a + b = b,
and + becomes the least upper bound (lub) of the lattice
〈K,≤K〉. This intuitively means that b is “better” than a.
As a consequence, we can use + as an optimisation operator
and always choose the best available solution. Other derived
properties are [1]: i) both + and × are monotone over ≤K ,
ii) × is intensive (i.e., a×b ≤K a), iii) × is closed (i.e., a×b ∈
K), and iv) 〈K,≤K〉 is a complete lattice where ⊥ and >
are its bottom and top elements, respectively.
A countermeasure (or controlling strategy) [3] is a run-
time execution trace of a controller E that follows the be-
haviour of a target F step by step acting according to con-
trol rules in Tab. 1. The resulting behaviour is denoted by
E.KF , where K is the semiring used for specifying quantities
to quantitatively estimate the contribution of each coun-
termeasure on the system workflow. The alphabets of E,
F , and of the resulting process E .K F are different, as E
may perform control actions of the form a, a.b, a for
a, b ∈ Act, denoting respectively the actions of acceptance,
that means that the action of F is accepted by the controller
E, suppression, that means that the action of F is hidden
(becomes τ) by E, and insertion, that introduces correct
action in front of the action of F . Each action of both the
controller and the target is associated to a value of the semir-
ing K, i.e., we have a couple (a, k) as label, where k ∈ K is
a quantity associated to the effect a.
Given an execution trace t = (a1, k1) · · · (an, kn), we de-
fine label l(t) = a1 · · · an, and run weight |t| = k1× . . .× kn.
Hence, we are able to rank different strategies and, even-
tually, select the “best” one as follows.
Definition 3.2. [3] Given an agent F , and a semiring
K, a controller E2 is better than a controller E1 w.r.t. F ,
E1 ≤K,F E2, iff ‖E1 .K F‖ ≤K ‖E2 .K F‖. E2 is always
better than E1, E1 ≤K E2, iff E1 ≤K,F E2, for any F .
Using the fact that the Cartesian product of semirings is
still a semiring, we can rank countermeasures according to
several criteria by exploiting the lexicographic order among
the considered semirings.
Definition 3.3. Let 〈K1,+1,×1,⊥1,>1〉 and 〈K2,+2,×2,
⊥2,>2〉 be c-semirings. Then, the associated lexicographic
order ≤l on K1 ×K2 is given by:







1 ∧ k′2 ≤1 k′′2
4. RANKING OF COUNTERMEASURES IN
THE CEMS CASE STUDY
The Customer Energy Management System (CEMS) is
an application service or device of low voltage grids for an
advanced energy management, based on tariff information
and an integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER)
for a more balanced grid stability. A basis for this control
Figure 1: ADVISE Attack Execution Graph for Man
in the Middle and DoS attacks.
network is established by the deployment of a comprehen-
sive Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI ) for Automated
Meter Reading (AMR), able to monitor the electricity con-
sumption of households collected by smart meters (see [7]).
Since CEMS may operate in a very hostile environment,
our security analysis focuses on two well-known attacks po-
tentially harmful for the CEMS functionalities, namely: 1)
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, consisting in the introduc-
tion of relevant quantity of noise in the bi-directional flow
of information between CEMS and the AMR gateway. This
may lead to a halt failure of the AMR gateway or CEMS or
to a delay of the Energy Management Gateway (EMG) ac-
tivity, thus reducing availability of the energy distribution
system; 2) a Man in the Middle (MiM) attack, capturing
messages exchanged between EMG and CEMS or between
CEMS and the higher control layer. For instance, the at-
tacker can delay the messages or alter their content to pro-
duce an undesired effect, or simply collect data, thus causing
a violation of integrity or confidentiality.
The first step of the Security Model Based Assessment is
the definition of the profile of an attacker. We assume two
profiles, a hacker and a civil activist, in which the hacker
has high technical skill, and might operate on commission
driven by gain, while the civil activist, moved by ideologi-
cal motivations, has a lower technical skill with respect to
the hacker. We exploit the ADVISE formalism and the re-
lated simulator. Fig. 1 shows the ADVISE Attack Execution
Graph (AEG) of both the DoS and MiM attacks, which aim
at achieving the three attack goals: availability, confiden-
tiality, and integrity violations. The AEG represents the
sequence of attack steps (rectangles in the figure) the at-
tacker has to perform in order to realize the goal (the three
ovals in figure). Squares represent different access domains
owned and triangles are the attacker skills regarding the next
attack step. Circles denote the knowledge the attacker ac-
quires while perpetrating the attack. We also define a set of
access domains, knowledge, attack skills, and attack prefer-
ences, initially owned by different profiles of attackers, which
represent the input to the ADVISE model. Moreover, the
attack steps of the model have a specific time duration, cost,
success probability, and detection probability, which are dif-
ferent according to the attacker competence and technical
skill, and represent the additional set of input to the model.
Table 1: Semantics definitions for quantitative control rules.
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a,k∗k′→ E′ .K F ′
(A) E




τ,k∗k′→ E′ .K F ′
(S) E




b,k→ E′ .K F
(I)
Thus the described AEG applies both to the hacker and to
the civil activist. Due to the different abilities of the consid-
ered attackers, the probability to successfully get through
the attack steps is higher for the hacker than for the civil
activist. Note that the setting values used in the model are
for illustrative purpose and should be used only for relative
comparison between the two profiles.
Initially the attacker has to gain the network access, Gain
Network Access in Fig. 1, a common step for the three goals.
The DoS attack is attempted by performing the Network
Scanning step to identify potential vulnerabilities of the
system. Once the network scanning has been successfully
passed, the attacker attempts the SlowFlooding step. In the
meantime, the attacker floods CEMS with a number of pack-
ets, thus overloading the target’s bandwidth and resources,
to achieve degradation of availability. However, to prevent
the system from recognizing the attack and defending it-
self, the flooding is started slowly, and only after a prelim-
inary degradation of the performance, represented by suc-
cessfully overcoming the SlowFlooding step, the next Flood-
ing Speedup attack step is carried out.
The MiM attack performs the Configuration step, which
is the activity required by the attacker to intercept mes-
sages on the network. The next attack steps are related to
the Public-Key encryption: i) the attacker intercepts a con-
versation request from CEMS (EMG) with its public key;
ii) attacker sends a conversation request to EMG (CEMS)
with its own public key; iii) EMG (CEMS) receives a request,
and sends a reply encrypted with the attacker’s key; iv) at-
tacker sends a reply encrypted with the CEMS’s key (EMG’s
key), intercepted at step i); v) attacker receives from CEMS
(EMG) a message encrypted with the attacker’s key. At this
point the attacker can decrypt the message, thus obtaining
sensitive information, and realizing the confidentiality vio-
lation goal, or s/he can modify the message and send it to
EMG (CEMS), thus achieving the integrity violation goal.
4.1 Evaluation of Countermeasures on CEMS
The execution of the ADVISE model provides information
related to: i) cost, ii) time, and iii) success probability to
achieve a specific attack goal by one of the two attackers as
shown in Tab. 2, Tab. 3, and Tab. 4. The cost measure is
modelled by the weighted semiringW = 〈R+∪{∞},min,+,
∞, 0〉. This cost represents the total amount of hardware/-
software resources spent by the attacker (to attack) and by
the defender (to defend). The delay suffered by the system
(again, considering attacks and countermeasures) needs to
be reduced as much as possible. To accomplish this, if t is
time-cost of an action, then we model it as 1/t and we adopt
the fuzzy semiring F = 〈[0..1],max,min, 0, 1〉 (we suppose
always t 6= 0). In this way, we compose two delays t2 > t1 by
selecting the higher one (1/t2 with respect to min), and we
prefer the lower delay (1/t1 with respect to max). Hence we
minimize the bottleneck delay during the system execution.
Finally, the success probability of an attack is represented
by the probabilistic semiring P = 〈[0..1],max, ×̂, 0, 1〉. On
the attacker’s side, such score represents the probability to
Table 2: DoS attack: total average time (T), success
probability (P), and cost (C).
Time Unit Success Prob. Cost Unit
Hacker Civil activist Hacker Civil activist
180 0.8664 0.6170 47.8555 45.4275
330 1 0.9962 54.9945 74.7150
440 - 0.9996 - 74.9700
Table 3: Corrupt Messages attack.
Time Unit Success Prob. Cost Unit
Hacker Civil activist Hacker Civil activist
170 0.85104 0.3366 51.0624 35.3430
350 1 0.9994 60 104.9370
430 - 1 - 105
Table 4: Read Messages attack.
Time Unit Success Prob. Cost Unit
Hacker Civil activist Hacker Civil activist
140 0.88589 0.42010 48.72395 39.9095
320 1 0.99960 55 94.9620
400 - 1 - 95
be successful, while on the defender’s side it models the ef-
fectiveness probability of stopping the relative attack: if the
countermeasure is 100% effective, then the probability p of
an attack is annihilated, i.e., p×̂0 = 0 (equal to ⊥).
Depending on which measure is prioritized, we have the
following categories. Secure countermeasures: the con-
trollers are ordered based on their security, measured as the
probability of being attacked, modelled by the probabilis-
tic semiring. Economical countermeasures: a controller
can be said to be economical when the priority is given to
the dimension of cost, modelled by the weighted semiring.
Hence, the obtained order on controllers considers the cost
on each trace, and the optimal controller is the one that
costs less. Ecological countermeasures: the fuzzy semir-
ing models the measure of consumed time, interpreted as
ecological impact. Hence the optimal controller is the low-
est with respect to the amount of consumed energy.
Referring to the attacks’ graph in Fig. 1, the action Gain-
NetworkAccess represents a possible first step of an attack.
Hence, the controlling strategies has a hook before this ac-
tion in such a way to be prepared to activate a possible
countermeasure. Let us consider three countermeasures:
C1 = (GainNetworkAccess.
SendAccessRequest, 〈x1, y1, z1〉).C′1
C2 = (GainNetworkAccess, 〈x2, y2, z2〉).C′2
C3 = (GainNetworkAccess, 〈x3, y3, z3〉).C′3
where both C′1 and C
′
2 behave according to the suppression
rule on all the other attacker’s action, while C′3 behaves by
suppressing the NetworkScanning action. Then we consider
that also this countermeasure works by accepting all the
other actions. C1 and C2 act differently only on the first
action GainNetAccess: C1 modifies the behaviour by intro-
ducing an access request to clearly identify the user as an au-
thorized one. C2 intercepts GainNetAccess and suppresses
it to avoid communication between attacker and CEMS.
The triple of weights 〈xi, yi, zi〉 ∈ {〈t, c, p〉, 〈c, t, p〉, 〈p, c, t〉,
〈p, t, c〉, 〈c, p, t〉, 〈t, p, c〉} represents the action costs of a
countermeasure, and depends on the lexicographic order we
select for computation. Referring to Def. 3.2, to compare
C1, C2, and C3, we have to apply them on the attacker’s
behaviour. According to the property of × operation and to
the definition of evaluation of a process, we have:
Property 4.1. For each execution trace tC of a coun-
termeasure C and tA of attack A JtC .K tAK = JtCK× JtAK.
MiM attack. Let us consider 〈t, c, p〉 ∈ K where K is
the Cartesian product of F ,W and P (ecological controller)
as lexicographic order to rank countermeasures Let us also
consider the MiM attacker corrupts the message (Tab. 3),
denoted by AMiMC . Then we evaluate all C1, C2, and C3
according to the considered ranking. JC1 .K AMiMCK is
〈x1, y1, z1〉 ×JC′1 .KAMiMCK. Note that, by definition of the
countermeasure JC′1 .KAMiMCK = JC2 .KAMiMCK. Accord-
ing to Prop. 4.1, being JC2K = 〈X2, Y2, Z2〉 where uppercase
variables denote the weight of the whole execution trace of
C2 and JAMiMCK are in Tab. 3, then JC2 .K AMiMCK =
〈min(X2, Ct), Y2+̂Cc, Z2×̂Cp〉 where Ct, Cc, and Cp are the
delay, the cost, and the success probability of AMiMC
JC1.KAMiMCK = 〈min(x1,min(X2, Ct)), y1+̂Y2+̂Cc, z1×̂Z2×̂Cp〉
According to Def. 3.2, C1 ≤K C2. Let us now compare C2
and C3: C3 accepts all the actions, 〈X3, Y3, Z3〉 = 〈⊥,>,⊥〉.
JC3 .K AMiMCK = 〈min(X3, Ct), Y3+̂Cc, Z3×̂Cp〉 = 〈⊥, Cc,⊥〉
Hence C3 is more ecological (less time) than C2.
Let us now consider to change the hierarchy of require-
ments by privileging those about the probability of attack,
then time, and finally cost requirements, 〈p, t, c〉 (secure
countermeasure). The new ranking leads to a new classi-
fication of countermeasures. Being Z2×̂Cp >P ⊥, we have
C3 ≤K,AMiMC C2. The new classification is made starting
from the existing evaluation (no need to perform it again).
DoS attack. Let us now consider a DoS attack, C1 is
again always worse than C2, due to the monotonicity of the
semiring. C2 suppresses all the actions of the DoS attack
while C3 suppresses the NetworkingAccess action. This in-
creases the probability of preventing the attack, time, and
cost of the trace. Hence,
JC2 .K ADosK = 〈min(X2, Ct), Y2+̂Cc, Z2×̂Cp〉
JC3 .K ADoSK = 〈min(X3, Ct), Y3+̂Cc, Z3×̂Cp〉
In this case, the hierarchy of requirements is crucial for rank-
ing countermeasures. For example, let us consider the first
line of Tab. 2 for the civil activist profile: Ct = 1/180,
Cc = 45.4275, and Cp = 0.6170. If X2 <F 1/180 and X3 <F
1/180 then min(X2, Ct) = X2 = min(X3, Ct). Hence, if
X2 <F X3 then C3 is more ecological than C2, otherwise,
if the vice versa holds then C2 is more ecological than C3.
Finally, if X2 = X3 then they are equally ecological, and
we have to rank them according to their costs. The same
reasoning can be done for the cost as well: if their cost is
the same, we compare their probability.
5. RELATED WORK
In this section we survey the related work on quantitative
measures driving the ranking of countermeasure strategies.
Some industrial approaches already exist, such as the Secu-
rity Analytics of HP Labs [10] that are mostly related to the
usage of possible private information and big data. Other
works in literature face a similar issue but, from the best
of our knowledge, they consider only one criterion. In [6],
the authors propose an enhancement of the software engi-
neering approach by considering security solution at design
time. The basic idea is to define security solution accord-
ing to a risk analysis in order to make them more efficient.
In [2], the authors introduce the notion of lazy controllers,
which only control the security of a system at some points
in time, and based on a probabilistic modelling of the sys-
tem, quantify the expected risk. In [9], the authors deal
with probabilistic cost enforcement based on input/output
automata to model complex and interactive systems. As-
sociating to each execution trace a probability and a cost
measure as a unique weight, it is possible to evaluate the
expected cost of the monitor and of the monitored systems.
In [4], a notion of cost is used to compare correct enforce-
ment mechanisms (defined as state machines) with different
strategies. [5] evaluates controlled strategies to find the opti-
mal one by using dynamic programming, taking into account
rewards and penalties with correcting actions.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work presents an adaptive multi-criteria framework
for the ranking of countermeasures to select the one that
satisfies the system requirements (arranged in a hierarchy)
in presence of an attack. We exemplified the proposed ap-
proach in terms of the CEMS use case. As future work,
we plan to introduce countermeasures as part of the system
model to evaluate their impact on the initial system accord-
ing to the criteria under analysis, and adaptively change the
ranking according to the obtained measurements.
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